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Introduction 
Although there exists a wide range of views about what democracy means, there is a 
general consensus in defining democratic regimes in terms of regular, free and fair 
elections. In many countries, parties are the primary actors in organizing elections, 
so that a widely accepted statement in political science affirms that they “created 
democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties” 
(Schattschneider, 1942: 1). Parties define the rules governing the electoral 
competition and control the recruitment of candidates for elective offices, hence 
determining the distribution of power and the identity of political elites, and finally 
shaping the chain of democratic accountability that links citizens and elected 
representatives. The study of political candidates – who eventually form the teams 
that compete for popular support, defining the composition of parliaments and 
governments – is therefore related to the very nature of representation, and allows 
to cast light on important issues such as party competition, intra-party politics and 
the functioning of legislative assemblies. 
The focus on individual candidates is also driven by a methodological interest in 
going beyond the empirically disputable “parties-as-unitary-actors” assumption, as 
well as by a substantial desire to understand the trend towards the personalization 
of politics (Karvonen, 2010; McAllister, 2007; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007) and the 
recent changes in the workings of parties as intermediaries between citizens and the 
state (Katz and Mair, 1995; Thomassen, 2014). The goal of this contribution is to 
provide a thorough review of the research that has been conducted on candidates. 
We discuss the theoretical approaches developed by scholars on the subject in the 
first section, the main conclusions of the empirical research in the second section, 
the methods and data employed in candidate research in the third section, and 
finally some possible trajectories for future research. 
Theoretical approaches 
Theoretical works on political candidates have most of the time focused on the 
relationships between political institutions and candidates’ characteristics and 
behaviour. In rational choice accounts, individual politicians are typically assumed 
to seek election – or re-election in case they already hold a legislative seat – as this 
enhances their ability to pursue offices or policies (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; 
Strom, 1997). Politicians will thus spend time and effort doing what they believe 
voters will reward in the next election. Vote-seeking strategies are sought after 
within a set of political institutions, which create opportunities and constraints on 
individual behaviour and shape the incentives faced by would-be legislators. 
Regime type, electoral rules, methods for selecting candidates and the hierarchies of 
elective offices can be treated as independent variables, as they are expected to have 
an impact on the traits of candidates and the choice of their behavioural repertoire. 
In what follows we concentrate on three major topics in theoretical research on 
candidates for political office: the effects of electoral systems, candidate selection, 
and career patterns. Each of these is related to prominent political institutions 
influencing not only who enters the legislative elites, but also how candidates 
behave during the electoral campaign and in the legislature if elected. 
The most well-developed theoretical framework for the study of candidates and 
individual politicians focuses on electoral institutions (André et al., 2014). Electoral 
rules differ in terms of whether they strengthen or weaken politicians’ incentives to 
cultivate personal reputation rather than the party reputation (Carey and Shugart, 
1995; Shugart et al., 2005). Specifically, in electoral systems in which intra-party 
competition is present – such as open-list PR systems – politicians are rewarded by 
voters for their personal reputation. Candidates are hence expected to cultivate a 
personal vote by maintaining a close connection with their constituency. On the 
contrary, under electoral rules that discourage intra-party competition – like 
closed-list PR or STV – the (re)election prospects of political aspirants are 
inextricably tied to their party’s electoral performance. This weakens candidates’ 
incentives to nurture a personal reputation among voters. 
In order to become members of the legislature, prospective politicians must pass 
two barriers, not just the electoral one. Before being elected by the general public, 
would-be representatives must be chosen by a party selectorate – that is, the body 
that chooses the party candidates. The same happens for incumbents, who have to 
be re-selected by their own party. Candidate selection – labelled by Gallagher and 
Marsh (1988) as the “secret garden” of politics due to the difficulties encountered in 
collecting empirical data on parties’ internal nomination processes – is the object of 
a second major theoretical approach to the study of candidates which has developed 
more recently (Ramney, 1981; Norris, 1997). Just like electoral rules, also the 
mechanisms governing candidate selection can be either more personal or more 
subject to the control of the party leadership (see Hazan and Voerman [2006] on 
the connection between the two types of rules) and can then have important 
consequences for the behaviour of individual candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2005). 
Two crucial aspects of candidate selection rules emphasized in this literature are the 
decentralization of the recruitment process and the inclusiveness of the party 
selectorate. Concerning the former, territorial or functional decentralization of 
candidate selection is expected to increase nominees’ responsiveness to the 
demands of their constituency (Hazan, 1999). As for the latter, which has been 
highlighted as more fundamental, a negative relationship has been theorized 
between inclusiveness and party cohesion. Since in order to be (re-)selected 
politicians need to satisfy and respond to the selectorate, more exclusive 
selectorates are expected to push candidates to engage in party-centred activities. In 
this case, to raise their chance of being recruited, politicians need to be responsive 
to a small partisan “oligarchy” formed by the party leadership or a restricted group 
of party delegates. In contrast, a more inclusive selectorate – composed by all party 
members or the entire electorate – implies the involvement of non-party actors in 
candidate selection, which can lead individuals to promote interests that are at odds 
with those of the party. This results in more candidate-centred behaviour (Rahat 
and Hazan, 2001; Hazan, 2014). While in the above mentioned studies candidate 
selection has been treated as an explanatory factor, a number of works have 
analyzed it as an outcome to be explained. This strand of the literature has mainly 
sought to explain the degree of democratization and decentralization in the 
selection procedures adopted by parties (Scarrow et al., 2000; Lundell, 2004). 
A third relevant perspective in theoretical research on candidates deals with career 
patterns. Early studies hypothesized a relationship between political institutions 
and political careers (Schlesinger, 1966) and analyzed the aggregate-level 
consequences of institutions on career patterns (Polsby, 1968). Starting from 
Jacobson and Kernell’s (1981) study of congressional candidates, more recent works 
have analyzed individual career choices in a micro-level perspective (e.g. Kiewiet 
and Zeng, 1993). In this view, politically ambitious candidates make their career 
choices in a given structure of political opportunities defined by a hierarchy of 
elective offices. Politicians attempt to move upward from less desirable offices to 
the smaller set of highly sought-after positions, while the availability, accessibility 
and attractiveness of offices condition individual ambition (Borchert, 2011). Career 
patterns have also been considered as an independent variable affecting intra-party 
politics, legislative behaviour and legislature’s policymaking capacity (Kousser and 
MacKenzie, 2014). At the same time, the sociological study of political elites has 
paid considerable attention to analyzing the composition of legislative assemblies, 
the gradual transformation of legislative elites in terms of their socio-demographic 
and political background, as well as the consequences of these changes for 
representative democracy (Best and Cotta, 2000). 
The empirical study of candidates 
The main hypothesis emerging from the personal vote literature described above is 
that incentives translate into different forms of behaviour that are commonly 
considered to be personal vote-seeking. In particular, general indicators of a 
conduct aimed at cultivating personal reputation are whether candidates carry out 
individualized electoral campaigns (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008), and – once elected 
– whether they engage in constituency service (Martin and Rozenberg, 2012; 
Searing, 1994), promote particularized legislation that primarily benefit their local 
community (Crisp, 2007), or break with party discipline in legislative voting in 
order to advocate on behalf of constituents (Carey, 2007, 2009; Cain et al., 1987). 
Comparative research has focused mainly on the link between electoral rules and 
legislative voting behaviour, using aggregated data of elected candidates’ roll-call 
votes. Contrary to expectations, Sieberer (2006) found that party unity is 
marginally stronger in candidate-centred than party-centred environments, while 
Depauw and Martin (2009) did not find a consistent effect of electoral rules on 
cohesion. Analyses comparing the voting behaviour of candidates elected with a mix 
of ballot structures have allowed further country-specific investigation, moving 
from party- to individual-level data. However, even in these cases the results are 
inconclusive (Martin, 2014). Following the format of single-country studies, 
scholars have shifted their attention to individualized campaigns. Contrary to 
legislative behaviour, campaign activities are more directly linked to electoral 
incentives and are not simultaneously affected by other factors such as legislative 
organization and regime characteristics. Furthermore, the study of personalized 
campaigns casts light on the role of candidates at the electoral level, openly 
addressing the concept of the personalization of politics. A review of case studies 
focusing on candidates’ campaign activities shows that, in general, electoral 
incentives fail in explaining cross-country differences, highlighting the relevance of 
additional factors affecting the behaviour of candidates (Zittel, 2014). 
The inconclusiveness of empirical results have pushed scholars to explore 
complementary explanations of candidates’ behaviour. Tavits (2009), examining 
comparative data on voting behaviour, found that candidates with local-level 
political experience tend to be electorally more successful, and, once in parliament, 
to behave more independently. Shomer (2009), studying bill initiation, found no 
support for the connection between candidate selection procedures and vote-
seeking behaviour, discovering instead that career patterns better account for 
individual-level variations. Similarly, Russo (2012), attempting to explain the cause 
of variation in parliamentary questioning – a proxy of constituency service 
engagement – found that, despite the closed-list electoral system, Italian elected 
candidates with a genuine local profile are those most likely to focus on 
constituency-oriented questions. 
Research methods in candidate studies 
Building on the exploratory studies on parliamentary roles and norms conducted in 
the 1950s and 1960s, research on candidates and elected representatives has usually 
been carried out using interviews and surveys (Bailer 2014). Elite surveys – whether 
personally administered as in interviews or self-administered as in structured 
questionnaires – are considered one of the most valuable sources of data for 
studying the attitudes and behaviour of candidates and representatives as they 
provide direct measures of the orientations and intentions of individual politicians. 
Recent prominent examples of surveys on political elites include: the European 
Parliament Research Group (EPRG), PartiRep, the European Election Candidate 
Survey (EECS), and the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS). The first two projects 
focus on elected candidates: the EPRG (Scully et al., 2012) provide data on 
individual members of the European Parliament, while PartiRep surveyed national 
and regional legislators in 15 advanced democracies (Deschouwer and Depauw, 
2014). Rather than concentrating on elected representatives only, the EECS – which 
is included in the PIREDEU project (Giebler and Wüst, 2011) – and the CCS have 
collected data about candidates running for European and national parliamentary 
elections, respectively. 
In particular, the CCS has collected data in 20 countries and 25 elections, using a 
common core questionnaire to allow for cross-country comparability. The topics 
covered in the survey include candidates’ socio-demographic profile and political 
background, previous political career, elite recruitment and candidate selection, 
engagement and mobilization, usage of campaign instruments, intra‐party 
democracy, value orientations and attitudes towards political issues and 
representation. The Italian module of the CCS constitutes the Italian Candidate 
Survey, which was carried out during the months immediately after the 2013 
elections in Italy (Di Virgilio et al., 2014). 
Future Research 
The impressive amount of information available on legislators has biased empirical 
research towards legislature-specific in-depth studies of the behaviour of elected 
representatives. However, the recent efforts in collecting cross-country survey data 
on many aspects of politicians’ activities and attitudes may open a new era of 
research in a wide range of areas. In particular, CCS data, which contain material on 
both candidates and elected representatives, are mostly yet to be explored. 
Specifically, the possibility to match self-reported information with other sources of 
data, such as the content of electoral campaigns and parliamentary questioning, or 
the patterns of bill initiation and roll-call votes in a comparative framework, gives 
the opportunity to generalise results beyond specific examples and better evaluate 
the effect of institutional variations. These developments could prove useful for 
scholars working in many sub-fields of political science, such as legislative studies, 
electoral studies, political behaviour and party politics. 
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